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Some people become so deeply bonded to various causes that their beliefs define who 
they are. This deep bond with causes can be understood within a framework of identity 
fusion. When individuals view a cause as a self-defining aspect of their identity, they feel 
a sense of underlying similarity—or shared essence—with other cause supporters based 
on their common beliefs. Because strongly fused individuals feel essentially similar to 
fellow cause supporters, they may likewise essentialize opponents of the cause by 
categorizing them into distinct “natural kinds” based on their ideological stance toward 
the cause. This tendency for essentialist thinking leads strongly fused individuals to 
discriminate against people who hold opposing beliefs about the cause. To test these 
ideas, I conducted 6 studies. Two studies showed that fusion with a cause predicted the 
tendency to essentialize others based on their sentiments toward the cause with which 
participants were fused (Study 1), but not other causes (Study 2). Three follow-up studies 
(Studies 3-5) demonstrated that fusion with a cause predicted discrimination against 
cause opponents, and that this effect was mediated by essentialist beliefs. Study 5 also 
showed that strongly fused individuals demonstrated intentions to attend events where 
 v 
they could antagonize cause opponents. Study 6 showed that fusion with a cause 
predicted political voting behaviors, but not as strongly as fusion with political party. 
Collectively, these studies identified a class of individuals who were prone to 
discrimination on the basis of ideology and the cognitive underpinnings of this 
predisposition. 
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 1 
Introduction 
Almost every day, it seems, the news media describe events in which individuals 
or groups passionately battle over some sociopolitical issue. From animal rights, to 
abortion rights, to gun rights, people often become deeply bonded to the principles that 
they stand for and go to great lengths to fight for them. When it comes to sociopolitical 
issues like these, most people have at least some opinion about which side of a given 
argument makes the most sense. For example, the issue of abortion rights has been a 
heated sociopolitical topic for several decades, and most people tend to fall either on the 
“pro-choice” or “pro-life” side of the fence. Despite the ubiquitous use of these social 
category labels, this binary categorization only reflects one dimension along which 
individuals can differ with regard to their stances on abortion rights. In reality, there are 
important individual differences with regard to people’s stances on sociopolitical issues 
that have nothing to do with the content of one’s beliefs. While virtually everybody can 
find one side of a given sociopolitical debate that they can agree with to some extent, 
some people experience a deep feeling of oneness with their sociopolitical beliefs to the 
point that their beliefs become an essential, self-defining part of who they are.  In 
extreme cases, some people perceive their beliefs about certain sociopolitical issues to be 
as self-defining as their own religion, ethnicity, or even gender.  
The central premise of this paper is that such a deep feeling of oneness with one’s 
beliefs can have a powerful influence over an individual’s thoughts and behaviors toward 
other people. Specifically, when individuals experience a deep feeling of oneness with a 
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set of principles and goals—or a cause—they tend to categorize those who disagree into 
distinct “natural kinds” based on their ideological stance toward the cause. These 
tendencies lead to discrimination against ideological adversaries, and resistance to 
romantic or even social involvement with those who disagree.  
The concepts discussed in this paper have intellectual roots in two major lines of 
research. One intellectual ancestor is a theory of group alignment called identity fusion. 
Whereas prior research on identity fusion has focused on the nature and consequences of 
feeling a deep sense of oneness (i.e., being “fused”) with a group, I explored the 
cognitive and behavioral implications of being fused with a cause. In addition, whereas 
past work has focused on pro-ingroup behavior, I emphasize thought and action towards 
outgroups.  
The other intellectual ancestor of this work is theory and research on 
psychological essentialism. Past research on this topic has investigated the effects of 
viewing certain categories of people (e.g., women, racial groups, homosexuals) as having 
an underlying essence that one cannot observe directly. However, little attention has been 
paid to exploring which individual difference variables may lead someone to view 
particular categories of people as having underlying essences. Here, I test the predictions 
that individuals strongly fused with a cause are especially prone to essentialize other 
people based on whether they support or oppose that cause, and that these essentialist 
beliefs will cause them to discriminate against the persons they have essentialized. To 




Identity fusion theory suggests that group members sometimes develop a 
powerful, visceral sense of “oneness” with their group. This sense of oneness is 
associated with porous boundaries between the personal and group identity; boundaries 
that allow for each identity to synergistically energize the other. Identity fusion resembles 
the strong feelings of closeness developed in some dyadic relationships (Aron, Aron, 
Tudor, & Nelson, 1991), except instead of experiencing love and devotion toward a 
single other, strongly fused individuals experience these sentiments toward a group. 
Numerous studies have shown that identity fused individuals are especially prone to 
endorse extreme pro-group behavior, including sacrificing one’s own life for the sake of 
the group (Fredman et al., 2015; Swann, Jetten, Gomez, Whitehouse, & Bastian, 2012). 
The strong association between identity fusion and extreme pro-group behavior has been 
the hallmark of identity fusion research to date.  
Identity fusion theory shares some conceptual overlap with social identity theory 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & 
McGarty, 1994) in that both theoretical approaches rest on a distinction between people’s 
personal and social identities. The concept of a personal identity refers to aspects of the 
self that make someone unique (e.g., being funny, short, or whimsical), while the social 
identity refers to aspects of the self that aligns someone with a group (e.g., being an 
American or Catholic; James, 1890). Although these two aspects of the self are central 
elements of both identity fusion theory and the social identity perspective, there are four 
core principles of identity fusion that distinguish it from other forms of group alignment.  
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First, fusion theory asserts that strongly fused individuals maintain a highly 
agentic personal self within group contexts. In contrast, social identity theory suggests 
that, when the group identity is salient, group members define themselves only in terms 
of their social identity and “depersonalize” by perceiving themselves and other group 
members as categorically interchangeable. The agentic personal self principle of fusion 
theory suggests that strongly fused individuals experience a strong feeling of group-
directed agency over the group which motivates them to enact pro-group behaviors 
(Gomez et al., 2011).  The results of several studies support this proposition. In one series 
of studies, researchers experimentally increased physiological arousal through physical 
exercise (sprinting, riding an exercycle, and playing dodgeball). As expected, increases in 
arousal heightened endorsement of self-sacrifice for the group among strongly fused, but 
not weakly fused persons (Swann et al., 2010). In other studies, researchers measured 
participants’ self-reported feelings of group-directed agency (e.g., “I am responsible for 
my group’s actions”) and found that perceptions of personal agency mediated links 
between fusion and pro-group behavior (Gomez et al., 2011).  
Second, while the social identity perspective assumes that the personal and social 
identities compete for psychological salience, fusion theory’s identity synergy principle 
assumes that both identities can be salient at the same time and can activate one another 
to reinforce similar behavioral outcomes. For example, when the personal selves of 
strongly fused individuals are made salient, they become especially willing to endorse 
fighting and dying to protect the group (Swann et al., 2009).  
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Third, whereas the social identity perspective assumes that alignment to the group 
is based solely on categorical ties to the group and involves viewing other group 
members as categorically interchangeable, fusion theory suggests that strongly fused 
group members care as much or even more about their relationships with individual 
group members as they do their relationship with the abstract, collective group entity. 
The relational ties principle of fusion theory assumes that strongly fused group members 
form close familial bonds (imagined or actual) with other members of the group, and that 
these bonds motivate behavior.  Fourth, the irrevocability principle of fusion theory 
suggests that once people fuse with a group, they tend to remain fused (Swann et al., 
2012). In contrast, highly identified persons should remain devoted to the group only 
insofar as the immediate contextual influences support such devotion. 
By definition, strongly fused individuals have a strong emotional connection with 
the group. It is thus not surprising that individuals who are strongly fused with a group 
experience heightened emotional arousal after receiving information indicating that their 
group is imperiled in some way, and that this emotional arousal motivates them to engage 
in pro-group behavior. For example, when individuals strongly fused with a group 
learned that group members might be killed in a hypothetical trolley dilemma, they 
became upset and these emotional reactions predicted subsequent endorsement of self-
sacrifice for the group (Swann et al., 2014b).  
A defining feature of identity fusion that is particularly relevant to the present 
research involves the concept of shared essence, which refers to a sense of deep, 
underlying similarity among members of a particular category (Medin & Ortony, 1989). 
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Prior work on shared essence has suggested that “ingroups” and “outgroups” are 
sometimes perceived to resemble natural kinds or species (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992), but 
the possibility that some individuals are more prone to such perceptions than others has 
been largely overlooked. People have been shown to attribute shared essence to entire 
groups of genetically unrelated individuals (Gelman, 2003; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 
2000; Hirschfeld, 1996; Medin & Ortony, 1989; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). Identity 
fusion theory suggests that when people are fused with groups, even large heterogeneous 
groups, they feel they share something in common with other group members such as 
blood, deep attraction, national identity, or a history of suffering (Swann et al., 2012). 
Perceptions of shared essence are not only believed to be associated with identity fusion, 
but may even give rise to the development of fusion. Furthermore, fusion theory suggests 
that perceptions of shared essence with other group members may explain why strongly 
fused individuals are willing to make extreme sacrifices for fellow group members whom 
they often do not even know. For example, priming perceptions of shared core values 
among ingroup members has been shown to increase willingness of strongly fused people 
to endorse fighting and dying for their group (Swann et al., 2014a). 
Identity fusion research to date has focused on the nature and consequences of 
being fused with groups. However, a central assumption of the present report is that the 
feeling of oneness that characterizes identity fusion may not be limited to groups. The 
purpose of this project is to explore the possibility that fusion with cause (i.e., a set of 
principles and goals) may have similar cognitive and behavioral consequences as identity 
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fusion with a group. Before elaborating on the potential implications of fusion with a 






















Defining fusion with a cause 
Just as being fused with a group is different from merely being a member of a 
group, being fused with a cause is different from simply believing in a cause. The word 
“cause” can be defined in many ways, but in the context of this project, a cause will be 
defined as a principle, goal, or movement that can be defended or advocated. When 
people become fused with a cause, it becomes an essential, self-defining aspect of one’s 
identity. Strongly fused individuals feel immersed in the principles associated with the 
cause and view their support for the cause as an irrevocable part of their identity rather 
than a mere ideological stance. Fusion with a cause occurs when an individual 
experiences a visceral feeling of oneness with a set of principles and goals.  
The experience of being fused with a cause and a group are similar in many 
important ways.  First, both forms of fusion involve the union of a personal self with 
another abstraction. Whereas identity fusion with groups involves the personal self 
joining with the social self, fusion with a cause involves the union between the personal 
self and a set of principles and goals. 
Second, strongly fused individuals experience a powerful emotional bond not 
only with the cause but all that it stands for. Accordingly, individuals strongly fused with 
a cause should experience intense emotional arousal when the cause or its supporters are 
threatened or imperiled in some way. Furthermore, in line with the previously mentioned 
findings from Swann and colleagues (2014b), it is expected that strongly fused 
individuals’ emotional reactions to threats to the cause will lead to retaliatory behaviors 
against perpetrators of the threat.  
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Third, fusion with a cause involves a similar sense of personal agency 
experienced by individuals strongly fused with a group. Fusion theory assumes that 
strongly fused individuals experience a heightened sense of group-directed agency which 
arises from the union between the personal and group identities. Because of this union, 
strongly fused individuals feel as though they must do everything in their power to 
further the goals of the group. Because fusion with a cause involves a similar union 
between the self and the cause, individuals strongly fused with a cause feel a similar 
sense of commitment to acting on behalf of the cause. Individuals strongly fused with a 
cause feel a sense of personal responsibility over the cause, as though they are in the 
“driver’s seat” when it comes to cause-related matters. This sense of agency makes 
individuals strongly fused with a cause uniquely poised to engage in behaviors that 
benefit the cause.  
Fourth, individuals strongly fused with a cause will feel a sense of shared essence 
with fellow cause supporters. While prior research on shared essence has shown that 
perceptions of shared essence among groups are especially prominent in groups that are 
highly entitative (McGarty, Haslam, Hutchinson, & Grace, 1995; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & 
Schadron, 1997) or organized around endogamy and descent (Gil-White, 2001), I propose 
that feeling a visceral sense of oneness with a cause elicits feelings of shared essence 
with fellow cause supporters based solely on knowledge of shared ideology. Because 
strongly fused individuals perceive their support for the cause as a self-defining aspect of 
their identity, they feel fundamentally similar to others who share a common perspective 
toward the cause.  
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It is important to note that although fusion with a cause elicits perceptions of 
shared essence among fellow cause-supporters, fusion with a cause can occur without the 
presence of a salient or entitative group, just as fusion with a group can occur even if the 
group is not rooted in a particular ideology or cause. A group can be defined as “two or 
more individuals who are connected to one another by social relationships” (Forsyth, 
2006). All groups are defined by a specific set of people. It is the members of a group that 
define it. Some groups, like religions, are explicitly rooted in a system of beliefs. These 
ideologically-based groups also consist of a clearly defined set of individuals. Whereas a 
cause is a specific issue that can be advocated or supported, an ideologically-based group 
like a religion has many “issues” or beliefs that it stands for. For example, one of the 
principles of Catholicism is that abortion is immoral because a child is considered alive at 
conception. However, this is only one “cause” in which Catholics believe. A cause, in 
contrast, is more narrow than a group or an ideologically-based group in that it involves 
support for a specific and individual issue. Furthermore, a cause is not defined by a group 
of people or a system of beliefs and rituals, but a specific set of beliefs about a specific 
issue. There are certain cases in which a cause is associated with a group to a certain 
extent. For example, animal rights may be associated with groups that support animal 
rights, like People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA). One could conceive of a 
continuum that ranges from fusion with a cause to fusion with a group. This project 
focuses on fusion that falls on the “cause” side of the continuum. 
Prior work on identity fusion and shared essence has focused on the relations of 
perceptions of shared essence to pro-ingroup behavior. The present research was 
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designed to examine potential links between fusion with a cause, shared essence, and 
reactions to outgroup members (i.e., individuals who do not share cause). In particular, 
individuals who are strongly fused with a cause feel a sense of shared essence with others 
supporters of the cause, but perceive opponents of the cause as being essentially 




















Research on psychological essentialism suggests that certain categories have an 
underlying reality or true nature that one cannot observe directly but that gives an object 
its identity, and is responsible for other similarities that category members share 
(Gelman, 2004). Essentialist beliefs have been studied in relation to a wide range of 
social categories (e.g., race (Hirschfeld, 1996), ethnicity (Gil-White, 2001; Verkuyten, 
2003), gender (Mahalingam, 2003), sexual orientation (Haslam & Levy, 2006), and 
Mental Disorder (Haslam & Ernst, 2002)), but little attention has been paid to essentialist 
beliefs based on the ideology of others. Furthermore, researchers have largely overlooked 
the possibility that individual differences, such as fusion with a cause, may dictate which 
particular social categories one perceives as having underlying essential properties  
The link between fusion with a cause and essentialist thinking grows out of the 
possibility that strongly fused individuals perceive their support of the cause as an 
essential, self-defining aspect of their identity. Due to the self-defining nature of the 
cause, strongly fused individuals tend to see the world through “cause-colored glasses”, 
including a tendency to see sentiments toward the cause as defining aspects of the 
identities of other people. Another reason that fusion with a cause leads to essentialist 
thinking is that strongly fused individuals have a deep emotional connection with the 
cause and view the cause as deeply personally important. Because they are so passionate 
about the cause, strongly fused individuals are intolerant of those who equivocate 
regarding the cause. Strongly fused individuals therefore adopt a “you’re either with us, 
or against us” perspective by categorizing other people into fundamentally distinct 
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“natural kinds” based on whether they support or oppose the cause. This tendency to 
essentialize others leads to discrimination and unwillingness to interact with ideological 
adversaries.  
It is important to note that prior research on identity fusion has investigated the 
potential relationship between fusion and essentialist beliefs. Gomez et al. (2011) found 
that identity fusion with country (Spain) was not associated with global essentialist 
beliefs (i.e., the belief, that, in general, certain categories have an underlying essence or 
true nature), which suggests that fusion is not associated with a general predisposition for 
essentialist thinking. This raises an important point of clarification for the present 
analysis: Fusion only leads to essentialist beliefs about the abstraction (e.g., cause, group) 
with which an individual is fused.  For example, someone who is strongly fused with the 
pro-choice position on abortion rights will not necessarily believe that (e.g.,) Muslims, 
white people, and New York Yankees fans have underlying essential properties. 
However, because the pro-choice position is an essential part of his/her own identity, this 
strongly fused person will view the pro-choice position as a social category—just like 
race, religion, or gender—that divides individuals into “natural kinds” based on their 
support or opposition of the position. In other words, an individual strongly fused with 
the pro-choice position would hold essentialist beliefs about pro-choice supporters and 
pro-life supporters. Therefore, individuals strongly fused with a cause only exhibit 
essentialist beliefs toward the proponents and adversaries of the cause with which they 
are fused. 
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 For strongly fused people, the combined effects of essentialist thinking and cause-
directed agency can have important behavioral implications. Examples of behaviors 
rooted in essentialist beliefs toward others could include prejudice, discrimination, 
derogation, dehumanization, and even efforts to completely avoid interacting with 
ideological adversaries. Because strongly fused individuals not only hold essentialist 
beliefs about others based on their stance toward the cause, but also channel feelings of 
personal agency into cause-related behaviors, strongly fused individuals’ are uniquely 
















Constructs related to fusion with a cause 
 To highlight the novel theoretical contribution of fusion with a cause, it is 
important to distinguish it from other conceptually related constructs. On a superficial 
level, fusion with a cause resembles attitudes toward a cause in that both phenomena 
involve individuals holding beliefs about a certain topic or issue. Attitudes can be broken 
down into many dimensions, or “facets”. The attitude facets that share the most 
conceptual similarity with fusion are attitude certainty, importance, involvement, and 
centrality. Below, I first provide an overview of these facets of attitudes. 
Attitude certainty is considered a facet of attitude strength and has been referred 
to as the degree to which an individual is confident in his or her attitude toward an object 
(Krosnick and Petty, 1995), the sense of conviction someone has about an attitude 
(Abelson, 1988), and the extent to which someone views an attitude as correct or valid 
(Gross, Holtz, & Miller, 1995). Attitude certainty is usually measured following a report 
of general attitude favorability using a singe-item which directly asks “How certain are 
you of your attitude toward attitude object?” (Norman, 1975; Fazio & Zanna, 1978; 
Tormala, Clarkson, & Petty, 2006; Clarkson et al., 2009).  
Attitude importance is defined as an individual’s subjective sense of the concern, 
caring, and psychological significance he or she attaches to an attitude (Krosnick, 1988; 
Krosnick and Petty, 1995). Attitude importance is measured by asking subjects how 
important an issue is to them personally and how much they personally care about an 
issue (Boninger, Krosnick, & Berent, 1995). Attitude involvement is conceptually similar 
to attitude importance and has been defined as the extent to which a person attaches 
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subjective importance to a given issue (Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent, & Carnot, 
1993; Lavine, Huff, et al., 1998). Attitude involvement has also been referred to as the 
extent to which an attitude object is closely connected to one’s important personal goals, 
desires, and wishes (Krosnick & Petty, 1995). Similar to attitude importance, attitude 
involvement has been measured by asking participants to rate the extent to which an issue 
is personally important, and the extent to which it is important that the government does 
what the respondent thinks is best on the issue (Lavine, Borgida, & Sullivan, 2000).  
Attitude centrality has been defined in many different ways. Attitude centrality 
has been conceptualized as the extent of functional connectedness among attitudes 
(Lewin, 1951; Rokeach, 1960; Katz, 1960; Bem, 1970), “the degree to which one 
particular opinion has implications and consequences for others”  (Tetlock & Suedfeld, 
1976), and  “the proportion of ‘mental time’ that is occupied by attention to the attitude 
object over substantial periods” (Converse, 1970). This construct has frequently been 
measured using questions about the importance of an attitude (Converse, 1964; Judd & 
Krosnick, 1982; Krosnick, 1986; Petersen & Dutton, 1975; Schuman & Presser, 1981), 
but the operational definition of attitude centrality that shares the most conceptual 
similarity with fusion with a cause is the extent to which one’s opinion about an object 
reflects one’s core values and beliefs (Clarkson et. al., 2009).  
In addition to attitudes, there are other noteworthy lines of research that share 
conceptual similarity with fusion with a cause. Research on sacred values has looked at 
the consequences of holding certain moral beliefs as being absolute and inviolable (Atran 
& Axelrod, 2008). Research on “moral mandates” (Skitka, 2010) and ideology 
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(Converse, 1964) have investigated the consequences of attitudes being held with strong 
moral or ideological conviction, respectively.  These constructs share conceptual 
similarity with fusion with a cause in that they all pertain to various aspects of an 
individual’s subjective relationship with their beliefs. Nevertheless, because fusion with a 
cause is defined by perceptions of shared essence with fellow cause supporters, it is 
uniquely associated with holding essentialist beliefs toward others based on their opinion 
about the cause. Additionally, because strongly fused persons feel a strong sense of 
agency and control over the cause, they are especially likely to act on their essentialist-
related beliefs. The present research empirically tests whether fusion with a cause is 
indeed associated with essentialist beliefs and behaviors. 
To examine the issues outlined in the previous sections, I have conducted a series 
of studies that explore the unique cognitive and behavioral consequences of fusion with a 
cause. In particular, the purpose of this project is to: (a) investigate the relationship 
between fusion with a cause and essentialist beliefs toward others based on their opinions 
about the cause, (b) test the prediction that essentialist beliefs motivate strongly fused 
individuals to endorse discrimination against non-like-minded individuals, and (c) 
determine whether threats to the cause amplify the effects of fusion and essentialist 







 Past conceptual analysis and empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that 
fusion with a cause should be an especially strong predictor of the tendency to 
essentialize others based on their beliefs about the cause. In Study 1, I sought to 
determine whether fusion with a cause is associated with holding essentialist beliefs 
about others based on whether they support or oppose the cause. Additionally, Study 1 
measured eight facets of attitudes which share conceptual overlap with fusion—attitude 
favorability, attitude certainty, attitude importance, attitude involvement, attitude 
centrality, attitude ambivalence, attitude accessibility, and attitude extremity—to 
determine whether the tendency to hold essentialist beliefs about others based on their 
opinion about the cause is uniquely predicted by fusion, or whether simply holding 
attitudes about a cause is sufficient to produce such essentialist beliefs.  
 Study 1 measured fusion with a cause and essentialist beliefs in the contexts of 
abortion rights and gun rights. These issues were chosen to be the focal causes with 
which to measure fusion in this study because abortion rights and gun rights have been 
prominent topics of sociopolitical debate for several decades, and virtually everyone has 
an opinion about or is at least familiar with the dominant perspectives on the issues. 
Additionally, prior exploratory research has indicated that fusion with one’s position on 
abortion rights and gun rights are normally distributed among Mechanical Turk 
participants. Importantly, although this study only measured fusion with a cause and 
essentialist thinking in the context of abortion rights and gun rights, the effects should 
hold true in the context of other causes as well. 
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Methods 
Study 1 was broken down into two sections, 1a and 1b, which were identical 
except that 1a was conducted in the context of abortion rights, while 1b was conducted in 
the context of gun rights. For Study 1a, a sample of 123 participants was recruited from 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, while Study 1b recruited a sample of 122 from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk. Study 1a was limited to individuals who side with either the pro-choice 
or pro-life position on the issue of abortion rights, and Study 1b was limited to 
individuals who side with either the pro-gun-rights or pro-gun-control position on the 
issue of gun rights. The study consisted of an online survey which Mechanical Turk 
workers completed for monetary compensation. Participants learned of the broad 
purposes of the study, their privacy and confidentiality protections, and that the survey 
would take them approximately thirty minutes to complete. 
In the first section of the survey, participants in Study 1a indicated which position 
they tend to side with on the issue of abortion rights (pro-choice or pro-life), and 
participants in Study 1b indicated which position they tend to side with on the issue of 
gun rights (pro-gun-control or pro-gun-rights). Next, participants completed a modified 
version of the verbal fusion scale (Gomez et al., 2011) intended to measure fusion with 
either their position on abortion rights (1a) or gun rights (1b) (e.g., “I have a deep 
emotional bond with the pro-choice/pro-gun-control position”). The full version of this 
scale and all other scales used in this study can be found in the appendix of this paper.  
After completing the fusion measure, participants completed measures of eight 
facets of attitudes. To provide context for these attitude facet measures, participants first 
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indicated their attitude favorability regarding their position on abortion rights or gun 
rights (e.g., “What is your opinion about the pro-life/pro-gun-rights position? [against—
in favor]”; Tormala, Clarkson, & Petty, 2006). Responses to the attitude favorability item 
were used to compute two facets of attitudes. Attitude accessibility was computed by 
measuring the amount of time it took for participants to respond to the attitude 
favorability item (Fazio, Powell, & Williams, 1989), and attitude extremity was 
computed by subtracting the midpoint (5) from the participant’s response to the attitude 
favorability item (1-9) (Binder et al., 2009). Attitude ambivalence was measured using 
responses to two items and plugging those responses into “the Griffin calculation” 
(Conner et al., 2003). The first item asks participants to consider only the positive things 
about (e.g.,) the pro-life/pro-gun-rights position, and to rate how positive those positive 
things are on a scale from 1-5. The second item asks participants to consider only the 
negative things about the (e.g.,) pro-life/pro-gun-rights position, and to rate how negative 
those negative things are on a scale from 1-5. The full version of these items can be found 
in the appendix. Responses to these items were then plugged into the following equation: 
Ambivalence  = (P+N)/2 - |P-N|, which is known as the Griffin calculation. Low scores 
indicate low ambivalence, which presumably reflects a strong attitude. 
Participants then completed measures of attitude certainty (e.g., “How certain are 
you of your opinion about the pro-life/pro-gun-rights position?”; Fazio & Zanna, 1978), 
attitude importance (e.g., “To what extent is the pro-life/pro–gun-rights position 
personally important to you?”; Boninger, Krosnick, & Berent, 1995), attitude 
involvement (e.g., “To what extent is it important that the government does what you 
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think is best for the pro-life/pro-gun-rights position?”; Lavine, Borgida, & Sullivan, 
2000), and attitude centrality (“To what extent does your opinion toward the pro-life/pro-
gun-rights position reflect your core values and beliefs?”; Clarkson et al., 2009). Note 
that the fusion and attitudes measures were presented to participants in random order.  
 Next, participants completed a scale adapted from Bastian & Haslam (2006) 
measuring the extent to which participants categorize others into distinct types of people 
based on their ideological positions toward abortion rights or gun rights. Example items 
include, “It is possible to know about many aspects of a person once you become familiar 
with their stance on abortion rights/gun rights” and “The kind of person someone is can 
be largely attributed to their ideological stance on abortion rights/gun rights”. The full 
scale is included in the appendix.  
There were two predictions for Study 1: 
• Fusion with one’s position on abortion rights/gun rights would be 
associated with holding essentialist beliefs about other people based on 
their positions on abortion rights/gun rights  
• Fusion would predict essentialist beliefs over and above attitude 
favorability, attitude extremity, attitude accessibility, attitude ambivalence, 
attitude certainty, attitude importance, attitude involvement, and attitude 
centrality  
Results 
 Results from Studies 1a and 1b supported both predictions. In Study 1a, a linear 
regression model tested the comparative effects of fusion with a cause and attitudes on 
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the tendency to essentialize others based on their beliefs about abortion rights. Included 
in the model was the fusion measure and eight individual attitude facet measures 
(favorability, ambivalence, accessibility, extremity, certainty, importance, involvement, 
and centrality). Only fusion (ß= .448, p=.000) was a statistically significant predictor of 
holding essentialist beliefs.   
In Study 1b, a linear regression model tested the comparative effects of fusion and 
attitudes on the tendency to essentialize others based on their beliefs about gun rights.  
Included in this model was the fusion measure and eight individual attitude facet 
measures (favorability, ambivalence, accessibility, extremity, certainty, importance, 
involvement, and centrality).  Only fusion (ß= .522, p=.000) was a statistically significant 
predictor of holding essentialist beliefs1.  
 Overall, Study 1 provided compelling support for the hypothesis that fusion with 
a cause predicts holding essentialist beliefs about others based on their stance toward the 






                                                
1 In Studies 1a and 1b, we also tested the comparative effects of fusion and all possible two-way 
interactions between the eight attitude facets (28 possible two-way interaction terms in each section). In 
both sections, using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .002 (.05/28), no two-way interactions between 
any attitude facets significantly predicted essentialist beliefs when included in a linear regression model 
with fusion. However, fusion was a significant predictor of essentialist beliefs in every model at p=.000. 
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Study 2 
 In Study 2, I tested the prediction that fusion with a cause is associated with 
holding essentialist beliefs about others based on their stance toward the cause with 
which the individual is fused, but not based on their stance toward other unrelated causes. 
This study measured fusion and essentialist beliefs in the context of abortion rights. 
Additionally, I measured essentialist beliefs about others based on an unrelated cause: the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
 Methods 
Study 2 measured fusion with participants’ position on abortion rights, and 
essentialist beliefs about others based on their stance on abortion rights and the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. A sample of 127 participants was recruited from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk. Study 2 was limited to individuals who side with either the pro-choice 
or pro-life position on the issue of abortion rights. The study consisted of an online 
survey which Mechanical Turk workers completed for monetary compensation. 
Participants learned of the broad purposes of the study, their privacy and confidentiality 
protections, and that the survey would take them approximately thirty minutes to 
complete. 
In the first section of the survey, participants indicated their position on abortion 
rights (pro-choice or pro-life). Next, participants completed a modified version of the 
verbal fusion scale (Gomez et al., 2011) adapted to measure fusion with their position on 
abortion rights (e.g., “I have a deep emotional bond with the pro-life/pro-choice 
position”).  
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Next, participants completed a scale adapted from Bastian & Haslam (2006) 
measuring the extent to which participants categorize others into distinct types of people 
based on their ideological positions toward abortion rights. Example items include, “It is 
possible to know about many aspects of a person once you become familiar with their 
stance on abortion rights” and “The kind of person someone is can be largely attributed to 
their ideological stance on abortion rights”. The full scale is included in the appendix. 
Participants also completed an essentialist beliefs scale measuring the extent to which 
they categorize others into distinct types of people based on their ideological positions 
toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Example items include “It is possible to know 
about many aspects of a person once you become familiar with their stance on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict” and “The kind of person someone is can be largely attributed to their 
ideological stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict”.  
There were two predictions for Study 2: 
• Fusion with one’s position on abortion rights would be associated with 
holding essentialist beliefs about other people based on their positions on 
abortion rights 
• Fusion with one’s position on abortion rights would not be associated with 
holding essentialist beliefs about other people based on unrelated causes, 
like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
Results 
 As predicted, fusion with one’s position on abortion rights was strongly 
associated with holding essentialist beliefs about others based on their stance on abortion 
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rights (ß= .444, p=.000). Furthermore, fusion with one’s position on abortion rights was 
not significantly associated with holding essentialist beliefs about others based on their 
stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (ß= .128, p=.220). These results support the 
hypothesis that fusion with a cause is associated with holding essentialist beliefs about 
others based on their stance toward the cause with which the individual is fused, but not 
based on their stance toward other unrelated causes. 
With this preliminary evidence in hand, studies 3-6 explore the behavioral 

















 In Study 3, I investigated the possibility that strongly fused individuals’ tendency 
to hold essentialist beliefs about ideological adversaries leads to endorsement of 
discriminatory behaviors. In particular, this study tests the hypothesis that individuals 
strongly fused with a cause are unwilling to associate with people who hold opposing 
beliefs about the cause in any way, from being romantically or socially involved with 
them to simply giving them the time of day.  
Within the context of a hypothetical dating scenario, participants evaluated a 
series of profiles of potential dating partners. Each profile contained information about 
one sociopolitical position that the hypothetical partner supported, and two personality 
traits that described the hypothetical partner. Each participant viewed a profile, which 
was referred to as the “target profile”, which described a potential dating partner who 
possessed two traits that the participant had previously rated as “absolutely essential or 
most desirable in an ideal romantic partner”, but also supported the position on abortion 
rights opposite from the participant’s (e.g., if the participant was pro-choice, the target 
profile partner was pro-life).  
It was predicted that, despite the fact that the individual described in the target 
profile possessed highly desirable traits, individuals strongly fused with a cause would be 
significantly less willing to be romantically or socially involved with the person 
described in the target profile. Furthermore, it was predicted that strongly fused 
individuals’ unwillingness to be romantically or socially involved with the person 
described in the target profile would be statistically mediated by self-reported essentialist 
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beliefs based on others’ ideological stances on abortion rights. As with studies 1 and 2, 
the issue of abortion rights was chosen to be the focal cause with which to measure fusion 
in this study because most people have at least some opinion about abortion rights, and 
because fusion with one’s position on abortion rights has been found to be normally 
distributed among Mechanical Turk participants in prior exploratory research. 
Methods 
 A sample of 222 participants who were not in romantic relationships were 
recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. This study was limited to individuals not in 
romantic relationships because romantically involved individuals may have been 
uncomfortable or hesitant to indicate their willingness to go on a date with a hypothetical 
dating partner in the study’s hypothetical dating scenario. Participants learned before the 
study began that the eligibility criteria for this study required that they not currently be in 
a romantic relationship. To ensure participants followed these directions, the study began 
with a criteria check asking whether the participant was currently in a romantic 
relationship, along with several filler questions to avoid transparency. Any participant 
who indicated they were currently in a romantic relationship were prevented from 
completing the survey. 
 Participants learned of the broad purposes of the study, their privacy and 
confidentiality protections, and that the survey would take them approximately one hour 
to complete. Participants learned that their participation in this study would contribute to 
a worldwide body of research that was attempting to understand the many social and 
personal variables that make people attracted to each other. Participants then learned that 
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they would be presented with several profiles of potential dating partners and asked to 
rate them on various dimensions. Finally, participants learned that before they viewed 
these profiles, they would be asked some questions about their personality and beliefs.  
 Following the introduction, the first section of the survey asked participants to 
indicate which position they tend to side with on three prominent sociopolitical issues: (a) 
abortion rights (pro-choice or pro-life), (b) gun rights (pro-gun-rights or pro-gun-control), 
and (c) same-sex marriage (pro-marriage equality or anti-same-sex marriage). 
Participants then completed the modified verbal fusion scale (Gomez et al., 2011) 
measuring fusion with their positions on abortion rights, gun rights, and same-sex-
marriage (Note: Although the focal cause with which fusion was measured in this study 
was one’s position on abortion rights, participants completed measures of fusion with and 
essentialist beliefs about two other non-focal causes to prevent hypothesis guessing).  
 Next participants completed essentialist beliefs scales adapted from Bastian and 
Haslam (2006) measuring the extent to which participants categorize others into distinct 
types of people based on their ideological positions toward abortion rights, gun rights, 
and same-sex marriage. Example items included, “It is possible to know about many 
aspects of a person once you become familiar with their stance on [abortion rights/gun 
rights/same-sex marriage]”, and “The kind of person someone is can be largely attributed 
to their ideological stance on [abortion rights/gun rights/same-sex marriage]”. The full 
scale is included in the appendix.  
 After completing the fusion and essentialist beliefs scales, participants selected 
from a list of twenty traits (taken from Fletcher at al., 1999) (a) the three characteristics 
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that are absolutely essential or most desirable in an ideal romantic partner, and (b) the 
three characteristics that are least essential or lest desirable in an ideal romantic partner 
(Eastwick, Finkel, & Eagly, 2011). After completing this section, participants indicated 
the three characteristics that most accurately describe themselves (Note: The least 
desirable and self-descriptive traits were not actually used in the analysis of this study. 
These questions were asked in order to maximize the believability of our cover story that 
we were genuinely interested in the factors that drive interpersonal attraction).  
 Next, participants engaged in a hypothetical dating exercise. Participants saw 
profiles of five potential dating partners. Each partner profile listed two traits of the 
potential dating partner and one ideological position. For example, a profile could have 
read “Ambitious, kind, pro-gun rights”. The focal profile for the purpose of this study, 
which was referred to as the “target profile”, described a potential dating partner with two 
traits that the participant previously rated as highly desirable, but also supports the 
position on abortion rights that opposes the participant’s own position. Participants also 
saw four other profiles, which were referred to as “distractor profiles”, which contained 
two traits randomly chosen from the list of twenty traits previously shown in the study, 
along with one random ideological position. The ideological position shown was 
randomly chosen from five options: pro-marriage equality, anti-same-sex-marriage, pro-
gun rights, pro-gun control, or the same position as the participant on abortion rights. 
Because the target profile portrayed a dating partner who supported the opposite position 
as the participant on abortion rights, this was the only ideological position that was not 
shown in any of the distractor profiles. 
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Before viewing the profiles, to enhance the believability of this hypothetical 
scenario and make it feel more natural, participants were instructed, “When viewing these 
profiles, try to imagine that you are on a dating website searching for a potential romantic 
partner.” The five profiles (one target, four distractors) were then presented in random 
order. After viewing each dating partner profile, participants indicated: (a) how willing 
they would be to give this person the time of day if they asked, (b) how willing they 
would be to help this person with directions if they were lost, (c) how willing they would 
be to respond to a message on a dating website from this person, (d) how willing they 
would be to be friends with this person, and (e) how willing they would be to go on a date 
with this person. These questions were presented in this order, which was believed to be 
in increasing order of intimacy. Questions (a) and (b) were intended to be exploratory 
items to gauge whether certain (i.e., strongly fused) individuals were willing to behave in 
extreme ways (i.e., not even giving someone the time of day) to avoid interacting with 
non-like-minded individuals. After viewing and evaluating each profile, participants were 
be debriefed and given an opportunity to write any questions or comments they had about 
the study. 
 There were four primary and two secondary predictions for Study 3: 
• P1) Fusion with one’s position on abortion rights would be positively associated 
with holding essentialist beliefs based on others’ ideological stances toward 
abortion rights. 
• P2) Individuals strongly fused with their position on abortion rights would be 
especially unwilling to go on a date with the person described in the target profile 
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relative to the people described in the distractor profiles, and this effect would be 
mediated by essentialist beliefs based on others’ ideological stances toward 
abortion rights 
• P3) Individuals strongly fused with their position on abortion rights would be 
especially unwilling to be friends with the person described in the target profile 
relative to the people described in the distractor profiles, and this effect would be 
mediated by essentialist beliefs based on others’ ideological stances toward 
abortion rights. 
• P4) Individuals strongly fused with their position on abortion rights would be 
especially unwilling to respond to a message on a dating website from the person 
described in the target profile relative to the people described in the distractor 
profiles, and this effect would be mediated by essentialist beliefs based on others’ 
ideological stances toward abortion rights. 
• S1) Individuals strongly fused with their position on abortion rights would be 
especially unwilling to help the person described in the target profile with 
directions if they were lost relative to the people described in the distractor 
profiles, and this effect would be mediated by essentialist beliefs based on others’ 
ideological stances toward abortion rights. 
• S2) Individuals strongly fused with their position on abortion rights would be 
especially unwilling to give the time of day to the person described in the target 
profile relative to the people described in the distractor profiles, and this effect 
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would be mediated by essentialist beliefs based on others’ ideological stances 
toward abortion rights. 
Results 
Results from Study 3 supported all primary and secondary predictions. For our 
outcome variables, five difference scores were computed by subtracting willingness to (1) 
give the time of day to, (2) give directions to, (3) respond to a message from, (4) be 
friends with, and (5) go on a date with the target profile owner from the average 
willingness to perform each of these actions with the four distractor profile owners 
(difference score = average willingness to perform action with four distractor profile 
owners – willingness to perform action with target profile owner). These five difference 
scores represented willingness to perform each of these five actions with the target profile 
owner relative to the average willingness to perform each of these five actions with the 
four distractor profile owners. Thus, high difference scores indicated lower willingness to 
perform these actions with the target profile owner relative to the distractor average. 
These five difference scores were then aggregated into a composite outcome variable 
representing composite relative unwillingness to interact with the target profile owner (α 
= .899). This composite outcome variable was the primary dependent variable used for 
our analysis.   
A linear regression model tested the main effect of fusion on composite relative 
unwillingness to interact with the target profile owner. Additionally, a mediation model 
was run using Preacher & Hayes (2004) bootstrapping methods to determine whether 
essentialist beliefs mediated this effect. The statistical significance for bootstrapping 
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analyses refers to the 95% CI’s of the indirect effect estimates (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; 
Shrout & Bolger, 2002), and for p-values we abide by the conventional α level cutoff of 
.05.  
Fusion significantly predicted composite relative unwillingness to interact with 
the target profile owner (ß= 1.983, p=.003). Furthermore, the effect of fusion on 
composite relative unwillingness to interact with the target profile owner was statistically 
mediated by holding essentialist beliefs about others based on their stance on abortion 
rights (5000 Bootstrap samples, Boot LLCI=.792, Boot ULCI=2.658; Sobel Z = 3.863, 
p=.000). The indirect effect of fusion on composite relative unwillingness to interact with 
the target profile owner controlling for essentialist beliefs was non-significant (ß= .407, 
p=.579), indicating full statistical mediation (Figure 1). 
 
FIGURE 1: Essentialist beliefs mediate the effect of fusion with a cause on unwillingness 
to interact with cause opponents. 
 
We also ran five linear regression models testing the main effects of fusion on our 
five individual difference score outcome variables. Additionally, five mediation models 
were run to test whether essentialist beliefs mediated each of these effects. Each of these 
models were statistically significant and supported the overall analysis.  
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The results from Study 3 strongly support the prediction that fusion with a cause 
leads to discriminatory behaviors against those who think differently about the cause. The 






















 Study 4 was intended to expand on the findings of Study 3 by exploring links 
between fusion with a cause and another form of discrimination rooted in essentialist 
thinking: discriminatory hiring practices. Specifically, Study 4 tested the prediction that 
individuals strongly fused with a cause would be uniquely unwilling to hire potential job 
candidates who supported the opposing side of the cause, and that this unwillingness 
would be rooted in essentialist beliefs toward people who think differently about the 
cause. 
 In a hypothetical job-hiring scenario, participants evaluated a series of bogus job 
applicants’ Facebook profiles and rated the degree to which they would be willing to hire 
each applicant. Participants learned that the job position to be filled was an office clerk (I 
chose a job that was not cognitively demanding so that participants’ hiring decisions 
could not reasonably be based on the job applicants’ possession of a rare or specialized 
skill set). Each participant viewed five hypothetical applicants’ Facebook profiles, four of 
which were referred to as “distractor profiles”, and one of which was referred to as the 
“target profile”. The target profile was similar in structure to the distractor profiles except 
that in one condition (congruent), it contained information suggesting that the applicant 
to whom the profile belonged supported the same position on gun rights as the 
participant, and in the other condition (incongruent) the target profile owner supported 
the opposite position on gun rights as the participant. It was hypothesized that strongly 
fused individuals’ tendency for essentialist thinking should lead them to be especially 
willing to hire the target applicant relative to distractors in the congruent condition, and 
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especially unwilling to hire the target applicant relative to distractors in the incongruent 
condition.   
Methods 
 A sample of 232 participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 
Participants were limited to individuals who had at least some opinion on the issue of gun 
rights. Participants learned of their privacy and confidentiality protections and that the 
survey would take them approximately one hour to complete. 
  Participants learned that the broad purpose of the study was to investigate how 
people make hiring decisions. Participants were instructed to imagine that they were an 
office manager at a medium-sized company who had been put in charge of hiring a new 
office clerk. Participants learned that they would view Facebook profiles of five job 
applicants, and that they were to rate how willing they would be to hire each applicant.  
Finally, participants learned that before they viewed these Facebook profiles, they would 
be asked some questions about their personality and beliefs.  
 Following the introduction, the first section of the survey asked participants to 
indicate which position they tended to side with on five prominent sociopolitical issues: 
(a) gun rights (pro-gun-rights or pro-gun-control), (b) abortion rights (pro-choice or pro-
life), (c) same-sex marriage (pro-marriage equality or anti-same-sex marriage), (d) 
climate change (believe climate change is real or do not believe climate change is real), 
and (e) minimum wage (support or oppose raising minimum wage in the U.S.). 
Participants then completed the modified verbal fusion scale (Gomez et al., 2011) 
measuring fusion with their positions on gun rights, abortion rights, and same-sex-
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marriage (Note: Although the focal cause with which fusion was being measured in this 
study was one’s position on gun rights, participants completed measures of fusion with 
their positions on the two other non-focal causes to prevent hypothesis guessing).  
 Participants then completed essentialist beliefs scales adapted from Bastian and 
Haslam (2006) measuring the extent to which participants categorize others into distinct 
types of people based on their ideological positions toward gun rights, abortion rights, 
and same-sex marriage. Example items include, “It is possible to know about many 
aspects of a person once you become familiar with their stance on [gun rights/abortion 
rights/same-sex marriage]”, and “The kind of person someone is can be largely attributed 
to their ideological stance on [gun rights/abortion rights/same-sex marriage]”. The full 
scale is included in the appendix.  
 After completing the fusion and essentialist beliefs scales, participants engaged in 
a hypothetical job hiring exercise. Participants viewed Facebook profiles of five 
hypothetical job applicants, four of which were referred to as “distractor profiles”, and 
one of which was referred to as the “target profile”. Each profile primarily consisted of 
innocuous filler information, like humorous pictures or articles, posts from friends, 
information about the applicant’s hobbies, etc. However, each profile also contained one 
post which portrayed the profile owner’s ideological position on a given issue. For 
example, a profile might have featured a post that read, “Proud to be a pro-life 
American”, clearly suggesting that the profile owner supported the pro-life position on 
abortion rights. To reduce noise, the four distractor profiles all showed an ideological 
position that the participant agreed with (based on their prior indications in the survey) on 
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the issues of abortion rights, same-sex marriage, climate change, and minimum wage. In 
a further effort to reduce noise, all profile owners (distractors and target) were Caucasian 
males in order to prevent hiring bias on the basis of race or gender. 
 Participants were randomly assigned to either the congruent condition or the 
incongruent condition. In the congruent condition, participants saw a target profile 
suggesting that the profile owner supported the same position as the participant on the 
issue of gun rights. In the incongruent condition, participants saw a target profile 
suggesting that the profile owner supported the opposite position as the participant on the 
issue of gun rights. Other than this variation in which side of the gun rights debate the 
target profile owner supported, the rest of the information contained in the target profile 
was the same for all participants.   
Participants viewed these five Facebook profiles in random order. After viewing 
each profile, participants indicated the extent to which they would be willing to hire the 
job applicant described in the profile. After viewing and rating each profile, participants 
were debriefed and given an opportunity to write any questions or comments they had 
about the study. 
 There were three primary predictions for Study 4: 
• Fusion with one’s position on gun rights would be positively associated with 
holding essentialist beliefs based on others’ ideological stances toward gun 
rights. 
• In the congruent condition, individuals strongly fused with their position on 
gun rights would be especially willing to hire the job candidate described in 
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the target profile relative to those described in the distractor profiles, and this 
effect would be mediated by essentialist beliefs based on others’ ideological 
stances toward gun rights.  
• In the incongruent condition, individuals strongly fused with their position on 
gun rights would be especially unwilling to hire the job candidate described in 
the target profile relative to those described in the distractor profiles, and this 
effect would be mediated by essentialist beliefs based on others’ ideological 
stances toward gun rights.  
Results 
The results from Study 4 provided mixed support for our hypotheses. As with 
Study 3, our dependent variables were difference scores representing willingness to hire 
the target profile owner relative to average willingness to hire the four distractor profile 
owners. Two primary outcome variables were computed, one for each condition. In the 
congruent condition, the outcome variable was computed by subtracting the average 
willingness to hire the four distractor candidates from willingness to hire the target 
profile candidate (Congruent outcome = Target willingness – Average distractor 
willingness). A high score on this variable indicated greater willingness to hire the 
congruent candidate relative to distractors. In the incongruent condition, the outcome 
variable was computed by subtracting the willingness to hire the target profile candidate 
from the average willingness to hire the four distractor candidates (Incongruent outcome 
= Average distractor willingness – Target willingness). A high score on this variable 
indicated lower willingness to hire the incongruent candidate relative to distractors. Thus, 
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in both conditions, we predicted that fusion would be positively associated with the 
difference score outcome variable. 
Fusion with one’s position on gun rights was strongly associated with holding 
essentialist beliefs about others based on their stance on gun rights (ß= .522, p=.000). In 
the incongruent condition, fusion significantly predicted unwillingness to hire the target 
profile candidate relative to the distractor profile candidates (ß= 3.184, p=.052). 
Furthermore, the effect of fusion on relative unwillingness to hire the target profile 
candidate in the incongruent condition was statistically mediated by holding essentialist 
beliefs about others based on their stance on gun rights (5000 Bootstrap samples, Boot 
LLCI=1.367, Boot ULCI=6.112; Sobel Z = 3.282, p=.001). The indirect effect of fusion 
on relative unwillingness hire the target profile candidate in the incongruent condition 
controlling for essentialist beliefs was non-significant (ß= .241, p=.891), indicating full 
statistical mediation (Figure 2).  
 
FIGURE 2: Essentialist beliefs mediate the effect of fusion with a cause on unwillingness 
to hire cause opponents. 
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Fusion was not associated with willingness to hire the target profile candidate 
relative to the distractor profile candidates in the congruent condition (ß= .528, p=.343)2. 
Taken together, the results of Study 4 provide further evidence for the idea that fusion 
with a cause is associated with negative discrimination against those who think 
differently about the cause, and that these discriminatory behaviors may be explained by 
strongly fused individuals’ tendency to essentialize opponents of the cause. Interestingly, 














                                                
2 To test for possible order effects, we investigated whether the target profile being presented first, before 
the distractor profiles, may have moderated the effect of fusion on willingness to hire the target candidate. 
Order effects did not moderate the effect of fusion on willingness to hire the target candidate in either the 
congruent (p=.255) or incongruent (p=.899) condition. 
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Study 5 
 Study 5 focused on a sociopolitical issue that has generated considerable 
discussion, debate, and activity at the University of Texas (UT) and throughout the 
United States. On June 1, 2015, Texas Governor Greg Abbott signed S.B. 11, also know 
as the “campus carry” law, which provided that license holders may carry a concealed 
handgun throughout university campuses starting August 1, 2016. The law gave public 
universities some discretion to regulate campus carry. UT community members including 
students, faculty, staff, alumni, and parents had mixed reactions to this new legislation. 
Some UT community members created a group called “Gun-Free UT” and organized a 
petition, demonstrations, and several group meetings to advocate that the university be 
declared an entirely gun-free zone. Other UT community members supported the new 
campus carry law and organized public demonstrations to defend their right to legally 
carry firearms on campus.  
Interestingly, proponents of both sides of the debate felt threatened by the agenda 
of the other side. Whereas opponents of campus carry felt that allowing firearms to be 
carried on campus was a threat to their personal safety, campus carry supporters felt that 
license holders being prohibited from carrying firearms on campus threatened their 
personal freedom, constitutional right to bear arms, and ability to defend themselves. 
With many passionate supporters on both sides of the debate, the campus carry law 
provided a promising context in which to study the cognitive and behavioral effects of 
fusion with a cause. 
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In Study 5, I sought to answer two overarching questions. First, do essentialist 
beliefs based on others’ opinions about a cause lead individuals strongly fused with a 
cause to endorse derogatory and discriminatory behaviors toward non-like-minded 
individuals? Second, because strongly fused individuals feel a sense of cause-directed 
agency that motivates them to stave off threats to the cause (cf. Swann et al., 2014b), 
might threats to the cause uniquely amplify strongly fused individuals’ endorsement of 
derogatory and discriminatory behaviors toward those who disagree? 
Methods 
 A total of 137 current UT undergraduate students were recruited using the 
Department of Psychology’s subject pool. The experiment consisted of an online survey 
which students completed for course credit. Participants learned of the broad purposes of 
the study, their privacy and confidentiality protections, and that the survey would take 
them approximately one hour to complete.  
 In the first section of the survey, participants read a brief description of the 
campus carry law that was recently passed in Texas, and then indicated whether they 
favored the pro-campus-carry position or the anti-campus-carry position. Next, 
participants completed an index of fusion with one’s position on campus carry (e.g., “I 
have a deep emotional bond with the anti-campus-carry position”) using a modified 
verbal fusion scale (Gomez et al., 2011).  
 Participants then completed an essentialist beliefs scale adapted from Bastian and 
Haslam (2006) measuring the extent to which participants categorize others into distinct 
types of people based on their ideological positions toward campus carry. Example items 
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include, “It is possible to know about many aspects of a person once you become familiar 
with their stance on campus carry”, and “The kind of person someone is can be largely 
attributed to their ideological stance on campus carry”. 
 The experimenter then randomly assigned participants to either a threat condition 
in which they read an article that threatened their position on campus-carry, or a control 
condition in which they read an article about UT having some of the best professors in 
the country. Since not all participants sided with the same position on campus-carry, 
threat articles were slightly different for pro-campus-carry participants and anti-campus-
carry participants. However, these articles were carefully designed to be as similar as 
possible with regard to wording, structure, and degree of conveyed threat. Both threat 
articles informed readers that UT had assembled a working group to determine how to 
implement the state legislature’s recent passage of campus carry laws. The threat article 
which was shown to pro-campus-carry participants included the following information: 
“After careful consideration, the working group has tentatively decided that it will remain 
illegal for any UT student, faculty, or staff member to carry a concealed firearm in any 
campus facility, regardless of whether they hold legal credentials to carry a concealed 
firearm. While UT acknowledges and respects the laws of the State of Texas, allowing 
the concealed carry of firearms on UT campus poses a threat to the safety and security of 
our campus and its members.” The threat article which was shown to anti-campus-carry 
participants informed readers: “After careful consideration, the working group has 
tentatively decided that any UT student, faculty, or staff with the necessary legal 
credentials may legally carry a firearm in any campus facility. UT seeks to uphold the 
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laws of the State of Texas and will accordingly implement the right for license holders to 
carry firearms on UT campuses throughout the state.” The full threat manipulation and 
control articles can be found in the appendix.  
 Immediately following the manipulation, affective arousal was measured using an 
emotions thermometer.  Next, participants completed a measure of cause-directed 
agency, which was a modified version of a scale designed to measure group-directed 
feelings of agency (Gomez et al., 2011) containing items such as “I am able to control 
whether the goals of the pro/anti-campus-carry position are fulfilled”.  
Next, participants answered a series of questions measuring endorsement of 
behaviors that derogate or discriminate against people who oppose their position on 
campus carry. Similar to the outcomes in Study 3, participants indicated whether they 
would be willing to be romantically or socially involved with individuals who think 
differently than they do about campus carry, and whether they would be willing to 
provide them directions or the time of day.  
Finally, participants learned that UT community members would be gathering on 
campus within the next week to sabotage an event being organized by the opposing 
position on campus carry and antagonize supporters of the opposing position. Participants 
indicated whether they would like to learn more information about this event, including 
date, time, and location. The outcome variable reflected the binary decision to either 
request or not request information about this upcoming event to support the cause. 
Participants also indicated the extent to which they intended to attend this event. 
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Participants were then debriefed and given an opportunity to write any questions or 
comments they had about the study. 
There were four predictions for Study 5: 
• Fusion with one’s position on campus carry would be positively associated 
with endorsement of discriminatory and derogatory behaviors toward 
ideological opponents 
• Holding essentialist beliefs toward others based on their ideological stance 
toward campus carry would mediate the effect of fusion on endorsement 
of discriminatory and derogatory behaviors 
• Threat to one’s position on campus carry would increase endorsement of 
discriminatory and derogatory behaviors for strongly, but not weakly 
fused individuals 
• Under threat, strongly fused individuals’ discriminatory and derogatory 
behaviors would be mediated by cause-directed agency and affective 
arousal  
Results 
 The results of Study 5 provided mixed support for our central hypotheses. As with 
Studies 1-4, fusion with a cause was strongly associated with holding essentialist beliefs 
about others based on their stance toward the cause (ß= .419, p=.000). Similar to Study 3, 
we computed a composite variable by taking the average of participants’ willingness to 
date, be friends with, give directions to, and give the time of day to someone who 
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supported the opposing position on campus carry. This outcome variable reflected 
composite willingness to interact with cause opponents (α = .834).  
Fusion with a cause was significantly negatively related to composite willingness 
to interact with cause opponents (ß= -.172, p=.003), indicating that individuals strongly 
fused with their position on campus carry were strongly unwilling to interact with those 
who supported the opposite position on campus carry. Further, this effect was statistically 
mediated by holding essentialist beliefs about others based on their stance toward campus 
carry (5000 Bootstrap samples, Boot LLCI=-.168, Boot ULCI=-.044; Sobel Z = -2.837, 
p=.005). The indirect effect of fusion on composite willingness to interact controlling for 
essentialist beliefs was non-significant (ß=-.071, p=.268), indicating full statistical 
mediation (Figure 3).  
 
FIGURE 3: Essentialist beliefs mediate the effect of fusion with a cause on willingness to 
interact with cause opponents. 
 
Fusion with a cause was also a significant predictor of the desire to learn more 
information (time, date, location, etc.) about an event that was presumably being held on 
campus in the near future to sabotage and antagonize supporters of the opposing position 
on campus carry (ß=.426, p=.014). Additionally, fusion predicted whether participants 
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actually intended to attend this event (ß=.155, p=.000). Essentialist beliefs did not 
mediate either of these effects. 
We predicted that threats to the cause would amplify strongly fused individuals’ 
endorsements of the previously mentioned outcomes (unwillingness to interact with cause 
opponents, desire to learn more about an event to antagonize cause opponents, and 
intentions to attend this event). The interaction of fusion and threat was not associated 
with willingness to interact with cause opponents (ß=-.051, p=.655) or intentions to 
attend the event (ß=-.034, p=.66). However, the interaction of fusion and threat was a 
significant predictor of desire to learn more about the event (ß=.77, p=.041) such that 
strongly fused individuals in the threat condition were most likely to request more 
information about the event (Figure 4).  
 




We also tested the prediction that, under threat, strongly fused individuals 
endorsement of our three primary outcomes would be mediated by cause-directed agency 
and affective arousal (moderated mediation). This prediction was not supported, as none 
of our predicted moderated mediation models were statistically significant with either 
cause-directed agency or affective arousal as mediators. However, there was a strong 
main effect of fusion predicting cause-directed agency (ß=.357, p=.000). 
Taken together, the results of Study 5 support the hypothesis that fusion with a 
cause is predictive of discriminatory behaviors against those who oppose the cause, and 
that these discriminatory behaviors may be rooted in essentialist thinking. Further, Study 
5 showed that strongly fused individuals want to learn about and attend events where they 
can support their cause and antagonize cause opponents. Fusion was also associated with 
cause-directed agency, indicating that strongly fused individuals feel a sense of personal 
responsibility over matters relating to the cause. Threat amplified strongly fused 
individuals’ desire to learn more information about an event where they could support the 
cause, but it did not amplify strongly fused individuals’ intentions to attend this event or 
unwillingness to interact with cause opponents. Threat also did not amplify strongly 
fused individuals’ affective arousal or sense of cause-directed agency. We investigated 
the possibility of a ceiling effect whereby lack of variance among strongly fused 
individuals with regard to our outcomes may have diminished their responsiveness to the 





 In Study 6, I sought to determine whether individuals strongly fused with a cause 
would be especially willing to behave in ways that support the cause. In particular, Study 
6 explores whether fusion with a cause and essentialist beliefs based on others’ positions 
toward the cause influence single-issue voting behaviors, with the prediction that strongly 
fused individuals would be uniquely willing to base their voting decisions on whether a 
particular political candidate supports the cause with which they are fused. 
 Study 6 was conducted using a longitudinal design in the context of the Spanish 
presidential election. Fusion with one’s position on abortion rights and essentialist beliefs 
about others based on their stance toward abortion rights were measured the week before 
the Spanish presidential election, and self-reported voting behaviors were measured the 
week after the election. Abortion rights were used at the primary cause with which fusion 
and essentialist beliefs were measured in this study because, as in the United States, 
abortion rights are a prominent sociopolitical issue in Spanish society, and voters tend to 
know where all presidential candidates stand with regard to their beliefs about abortion 
rights.  
Methods 
 A sample of 211 undergraduates at Universidad Nacional de Educacion a 
Distancia (UNED) were recruited to participate in this study in exchange for research 
credit. Participants were informed at time one (the week before the presidential election) 
that they would be contacted again in roughly one week for a second part of the study 
(time two).  
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At time one, participants indicated which position they tend to side with on the 
issue of abortion rights (pro-choice or pro-life). Participants then completed the modified 
verbal fusion scale (Gomez et al., 2011) measuring fusion with their position on abortion 
rights, and another verbal fusion scale measuring fusion with their preferred political 
party. Participants then completed an essentialist beliefs scale adapted from Bastian and 
Haslam (2006) measuring the extent to which they categorize others into distinct types of 
people based on their ideological positions toward abortion rights. 
 At time two, participants reported who they actually voted for in the Spanish 
presidential election. Answer choices included the most prominent presidential 
candidates, “Other”, “I didn’t vote”, and “I’d rather not say”. The outcome variable was 
binary and reflected whether the participant did or did not vote for a political candidate 
who supported the same position as them on abortion rights. Participants were then 
debriefed and given an opportunity to write any questions or comments they had about 
the study. 
 There were two primary predictions for Study 6: 
• Fusion with one’s position on abortion rights would be positively associated with 
holding essentialist beliefs based on others’ ideological stances toward abortion 
rights. 
• Individuals strongly fused with their position on abortion rights would be 
especially likely to vote for a political candidate who supports the same position 
on abortion rights (congruent vote), and this effect would be mediated by 
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essentialist beliefs associated with others’ ideological stances toward abortion 
rights.  
Results 
 The results of Study 6 provided mixed support for our central hypotheses. As with 
studies 1-5, the results of Study 6 showed a strong relationship between fusion and 
essentialist beliefs (ß = .443, p=.000). Additionally, fusion with one’s position on 
abortion rights was associated with voting for a political candidate who supported the 
same position on abortion rights (ß = .257, p=.028). However, the hypothesized link 
between essentialist beliefs and congruent vote was not statistically significant (ß = .237, 
p=.071), which is why the mediation model with fusion as the independent variable, 
congruent vote as the dependent variable, and essentialist beliefs as the mediating 
variable was also non-significant (Sobel Z=.843, p=.399)3.  
In an additional analysis, we explored whether fusion with one’s preferred 
political party was associated with congruent vote, and found that this relationship was 
statistically significant (ß = .415, p=.003). Additionally, fusion with political party 
mediated the effect of fusion with a cause on congruent vote (5000 Bootstrap samples, 
Boot LLCI=.022, Boot ULCI=.263; Sobel Z = 2.233, p=.026). The indirect effect of 
fusion with a cause on congruent vote controlling for fusion with political party was non-
significant (ß= .156, p=.210), indicating full statistical mediation (Figure 5).  
                                                
3 We also tested whether the interaction between fusion with a cause and essentialist beliefs predicted 
congruent vote, and this effect was non-significant (ß = -.024, p=.827). 
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FIGURE 5: Fusion with political party mediates the effect of fusion with a cause on 
congruent voting.  
 
The results of Study 6 provide further support for the strong association between 
fusion with a cause and essentialist thinking based on others’ stance toward the cause. 
The results of Study 6 also show that fusion with a cause predicts overt, real-world 
behaviors that support the cause. Further, the longitudinal design of Study 6 provides 
support for the assumption that fusion with a cause predicts subsequent cause-related 
behaviors, and cannot be attributed to a tendency for cause-related behaviors to foster 
fusion. However, because essentialist beliefs did not significantly mediate the effect of 
fusion on voting behaviors, Study 6 does not provide support for essentialist beliefs as the 
underlying mechanism of the link between fusion and cause-related behaviors. 
Additionally, the strong relationship between fusion with political party and voting 
behaviors, and the mediating role of fusion with political party may suggest that, when it 
comes to voting behaviors, political party allegiance may have a stronger influence than 
one’s level of fusion with a particular sociopolitical issue. Presumably, fusion with 
political party was a stronger predictor of voting behaviors than fusion with a cause 
because the former accounts for alignment with both people and a cause, whereas the 
latter only accounts for alignment with a cause.  
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Discussion 
 Taken together, the results of these studies shed light on the consequences of a 
novel form of alignment with one’s principles and goals. Specifically, individuals 
strongly fused with a cause are especially prone to hold essentialist beliefs about other 
people based on their stance toward the cause, which leads to discrimination against non-
like-minded individuals. Additionally, individuals strongly fused with a cause engage in 
overt behaviors that support the cause, like voting for cause-sharing presidential 
candidates.   
The support gathered for the hypothesized links between fusion, essentialist 
thinking, and discriminatory behavior help explain why people who are deeply passionate 
about their beliefs often feel animosity toward ideological adversaries. Categorizing 
ideological dissenters as distinct “types” of people can lead to discrimination. 
Furthermore, by establishing and replicating strong links between fusion with a cause and 
essentialist thinking, these studies help to understand a specific individual difference—
fusion with a cause—which makes certain people especially prone to such discriminatory 
tendencies. Furthermore, the mediating role of essentialist beliefs sheds light on the 
reason strongly fused individuals discriminate against ideological opponents.  
In studies three, four and five, fusion with a cause was associated with 
unwillingness to date, be friends with, respond to a message from, and hire someone who 
held opposing beliefs about the cause. These findings, although informative, do not 
capture the full impact that strongly fused individuals’ essentialist beliefs have on their 
behaviors. Strongly fused individuals’ unwillingness to give directions or even the time 
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of day to opponents of the cause demonstrate the great lengths that strongly fused 
individuals will go to avoid interaction with non-like-minded individuals. These extreme 
efforts to avoid interaction with ideological adversaries highlight the powerful influence 
that fusion and essentialist beliefs have on one’s social judgments and behaviors.    
Interestingly, fusion and essentialism were associated with negative 
discrimination, but not positive discrimination. That is, strongly fused individuals’ 
essentialist beliefs led them to discriminate against those who opposed the cause, but they 
did not show a tendency to favor others who supported the cause. This finding may be 
attributable to negative information being more salient and impactful than positive 
information, in line with a wide body of research on positive-negative asymmetry 
(Baumeister et al., 2001; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Rozin & Royzman, 2001) 
highlighting the disproportionate impact of negative over positive stimuli. In practice, 
when strongly fused individuals are deciding whether they want to date, socialize, or hire 
someone, they may consider it a “deal breaker” if that person holds opposing beliefs 
about a cause with which they are fused. However, ideological alignment with regard to 
the cause may not be sufficient to guarantee favorable treatment. 
Study 5 replicated the effects of Studies 3 and 4 by showing that fusion with a 
cause is associated with endorsement of discrimination against cause opponents, and that 
these discriminatory inclinations can be explained by strongly fused individuals’ 
tendency for essentialist thinking. Study 5 also showed that strongly fused individuals are 
especially interested in learning about and attending events where they can support the 
cause and antagonize cause opponents, and that strongly fused individuals experience a 
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heightened sense of cause-directed agency. Threats to the cause moderated strongly fused 
individuals endorsement of certain outcomes, but not others. One possible explanation for 
the lack of consistent threat effects may be that, because the threat came from the 
university working group that holds a great deal of power and authority, student 
participants may have felt powerless against the threat. Had the threat come from a less 
powerful or authoritative source, student participants may have felt like they could have 
actually done something about the threat, which may have led them to react differently.  
Study 6 showed that individuals strongly fused with a cause were especially likely 
to vote for a presidential candidate who supported the cause. This finding established that 
fusion with a cause predicts real-world behaviors that benefit the cause. However, 
although fusion was associated with the tendency to essentialize others based on their 
stance toward the cause, essentialist beliefs did not mediate the effect of fusion on voting 
for a cause-supporting candidate. The lack of significant mediation in this case may be 
attributable to the noisy study environment in Study 6 compared to those of Studies 3 and 
4. Whereas we were able to isolate the effect that disagreement over a particular issue had 
on fused individuals’ behavior in Studies 3 and 4, in Study 6, participants knew far more 
about the real Spanish presidential candidates than simply their stance on abortion rights, 
and it is likely that these other considerations influenced them. Another possibility is that 
single-issue voting is not truly a discriminatory behavior, which is why it was not 
strongly linked to essentialist beliefs. Future studies should explore which types of cause-
related behaviors are explained by essentialist thinking, and which are not.  
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The fact that fusion with political party mediated the effect of fusion with a cause 
on voting behavior in Study 6, rather than the opposite, indicates that fusion with political 
party is more determinative of voting behavior. Presumably, this reflects the fact that 
fusion with political party involves allegiance to both people (i.e., a sense of kinship with 
fellow political party supporters) and the cause or causes that the party supports, whereas 
fusion with a cause only involves allegiance to a cause. The predictive power of fusion 
with a cause may be limited in that it is not as predictive as fusion with groups when it 
comes to outcomes that are rooted in alignment with both the cause and a group, like 
voting behaviors. Study 6 may also shed light on the unique circumstances created when 
a cause is associated with a particular group. In this case, political parties are clearly 
supportive of one side of the abortion rights debate or the other. The fact that essentialist 
beliefs did not mediate the effect of fusion with a cause on voting behaviors may suggest 
that essentialism plays a stronger role when a cause is not associated with a group.  
 In closing, this series of studies has helped identify a class of individuals who are 
especially likely to discriminate against others on the basis of ideological differences. 
Moreover, essentialist thinking may explain why strongly fused individuals are prone to 
such discrimination. Viewing one’s social environment in black and white, “us versus 
them” terms may come naturally for some, but it could have deleterious social 
consequences. Identifying fusion with a cause as a predictor of this mindset and these 
behaviors helps to elucidate the cognitive and emotional antecedents that drive these 




• Verbal fusion scale (adapted from Gomez et al., 2011) 
o The [pro-life/pro-choice] / [pro-gun-rights/pro-gun-control] position is me. 
o I am one with the [pro-life/pro-choice] / [pro-gun-rights/pro-gun-control] 
position. 
o I feel immersed in the [pro-life/pro-choice] / [pro-gun-rights/pro-gun-
control] position. 
o I have a deep emotional bond with the [pro-life/pro-choice] / [pro-gun-
rights/pro-gun-control] position. 
o I am strong because of the [pro-life/pro-choice] / [pro-gun-rights/pro-gun-
control] position. 
o I’ll do more for the [pro-life/pro-choice] / [pro-gun-rights/pro-gun-control] 
position than any other cause supporter would do. 
o I make the [pro-life/pro-choice] / [pro-gun-rights/pro-gun-control] position 
strong. 
• Essentialist beliefs based on ideology (modified from Bastian and Haslam, 2006) 
o This scale measures the extent to which participants categorize others into 
distinct types of people based on their ideological positions toward 
abortion rights or gun rights. 
! It is possible to know about many aspects of a person once you 
become familiar with their stance on [abortion rights/gun rights].  
! Generally speaking, once you know someone’s position on 
[abortion rights/gun rights] it is possible to predict how they will 
behave in most contexts. 
! Become familiar with someone’s stance on [abortion rights/gun 
rights] allows you to know what ‘type’ of person they are 
relatively quickly. 
! The kind of person someone is, is clearly defined; they are either 
[pro-life or pro-choice] / [pro-gun-rights or pro-gun-control]. 
! There are two types of people in this world: [pro-life and pro-
choice] / [pro-gun-rights and pro-gun-control]. 
! The kind of person someone is can be largely attributed to their 
ideological stance on [abortion rights/gun rights]. 
 
Study 1 
• Attitudes scales 
o General attitude favorability:  “What is your opinion about the [pro-
life/pro-choice] / [pro-gun-rights/pro-gun-control] position?” (Please 
indicate your opinion on a scale from 1= against to 9= in favor) (Clarkson 
et al., 2009) 
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o Attitude accessibility (Fazio, Powell, & Williams, 1989)—response 
latency for general attitude favorability item 
o Attitude extremity (Binder et al., 2009)—response to attitude favorability 
item (1-9) minus scale midpoint (5) 
o Attitude ambivalence (Conner et al., 2003) 
! P: “Consider, for a few moments, only the POSITIVE things about 
the (e.g.,) pro-choice position, and ignore any negative things 
about it. Please rate how positive those positive things are. [1-5]” 
! N: “Consider, for a few moments, only the NEGATIVE things 
about the pro-choice position, and ignore any positive things about 
it. Please rate how negative those negative things are. [1-5]” 
! Ambivalence = (P+N)/2 - |P-N|  
• This is called the “Griffin calculation”  
o Attitude certainty: “How certain are you of your opinion about the [pro-
life/pro-choice] / [pro-gun-rights/pro-gun-control] position?” (Please 
indicate your response on a scale from 1= not certain at all to 9= 
extremely certain) (Tormala, Clarkson, & Petty, 2006; derived from Fazio 
& Zanna, 1978) 
o Attitude importance: “To what extent is the [pro-life/pro-choice] / [pro-
gun-rights/pro-gun-control] position personally important to you?” and 
“How much do you care about [pro-life/pro-choice] / [pro-gun-rights/pro-
gun-control] position?” (Please indicate your response on a scale from 1= 
not at all to 9= very much) (Boninger, Krosnick, & Berent, 1995) 
o Attitude involvement: “To what extent is it important that the government 
does what you think is best for the [pro-life/pro-choice] / [pro-gun-
rights/pro-gun-control] position?” (Please indicate your response on a 
scale from 1= not at all to 9= very much) (Lavine, Borgida, & Sullivan, 
2000) 
o Attitude centrality: “To what extent does your opinion toward the [pro-
life/pro-choice] / [pro-gun-rights/pro-gun-control] position reflect your 
core values and beliefs?” (Please indicate your response on a scale from 
1= not at all to 9= very much) (Clarkson et al., 2009) 
 
Study 3 
• Ideal traits questionnaire (adapted from Eastwick, Finkel, & Eagly, 2011) 
o Participants select from a list of various traits (taken from Fletcher et al., 
1999) (a) the three characteristics that are absolutely essential or most 
desirable in an ideal romantic partner, (b) the three characteristics that are 
least essential or least desirable in an ideal romantic partner, and (c) the 
three characteristics that most accurately describe yourself. 
• Partner evaluations 
o If you bumped into this person at the grocery store, how willing would 
you be to give them the time of day if they asked? 
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o If you encountered this person on the street and the were lost, how willing 
would you be to help them with directions? 
o If this person sent you a message on a dating website, how likely would 
you be to respond? 
o How willing would you be to be friends with this person? 
o How willing would you be to go on a date with this person? 
o (all on a scale from 0=not at all willing to 100=completely willing) 
 
Study 4 
• Job applicant evaluation 
o How willing would you be to hire this person as an office clerk? 
o (on a scale from 0= not at all willing to 100=completely willing) 
 
Study 5 
• Cause-directed agency (adapted from Gomez et al., 2011)  
o “I am able to control whether the goals of the pro/anti-campus-carry 
position are fulfilled.” 
o “I usually feel responsible for whether the pro/anti-campus-carry position 
meets its goals.” 
o “I am able to control whether the pro/anti-campus-carry position succeeds 
or fails.” 
o “I feel as responsible for the successes and failures of the pro/anti-campus-
carry position as I do my own personal successes and failures.” 
o “I feel responsible for defending the principles of the pro/anti-campus-
carry position.” 
o “I am able to control the actions of other supporters of the pro/anti-
campus-carry position.” 
• Manipulation: 
o Threat condition: Participants in the threat condition will read an article 
that threatens their position on campus-carry.  
! Pro-campus-carry participants in the threat condition will read the 
following: 
• “UT has assembled a working group to determine how to 
implement the state legislature’s recent passage of campus 
carry laws (SB11) granting license holders the right to 
carry a concealed handgun throughout university campuses 
starting August 1, 2016. Although this legislation has 
passed at the state level, the law gives universities full 
discretion over how to implement campus carry laws. After 
careful consideration, the working group has tentatively 
decided that it will remain illegal for any UT student, 
faculty, or staff to carry a concealed firearm in any campus 
facility, regardless of whether they hold legal credentials to 
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carry a concealed firearm. While UT acknowledges and 
respects the laws of the State of Texas, allowing the 
concealed carry of firearms on UT campus poses a threat 
to the safety and security of our campus and its members. 
For this reason, UT has decided not to implement campus 
carry laws on any of their campuses throughout the state. 
Before finalizing this decision, the campus carry working 
group is scheduled to hold a meeting next month to review 
any remaining concerns from UT community members.” 
! Anti-campus-carry participants in the threat condition will read the 
following: 
• “UT has assembled a working group to determine how to 
implement the state legislature’s recent passage of campus 
carry laws (SB11) granting license holders the right to 
carry a concealed handgun throughout university campuses 
starting August 1, 2016. Although this legislation has 
passed at the state level, the law gives universities full 
discretion over how to implement campus carry laws. After 
careful consideration, the working group has tentatively 
decided that any UT student, faculty, or staff with the 
necessary legal credentials may legally carry a firearm in 
any campus facility. UT seeks to uphold the laws of the 
State of Texas and will accordingly implement the right for 
license holders to carry firearms on UT campuses 
throughout the state. Before finalizing this decision, the 
campus carry working group is scheduled to hold a 
meeting next month to review any remaining concerns from 
UT community members.” 
o Control condition: 
! All participants in the control condition will read the following: 
• “The University of Texas at Austin has some of the best 
professors in the country. Based on the opinions from the 
students, that is. Ratemyprofessor.com released a list of the 
schools with the highest faculty ratings by students. The 
University of Texas finished in 12th place. Topping the list 
was Ole Miss, followed by the University of Wisconsin and 
James Madison. Texas A&M was the only other Texas 
school on the list, finishing in 7th.” 
• Emotions thermometer 
o By clicking and dragging the sliding scale below, please indicate your 
mood right now. 
• Event to support/oppose campus carry 
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o Students, faculty, and other campus community members are gathering on 
campus to PROTEST/VOICE THEIR SUPPORT FOR [OPPOSITE OF 
PARTICIPANT] the Campus Carry Law (SB11) at UT next week on the 
West Mall. Although our presence likely will not be welcome or 
appreciated, a group of campus carry SUPPORTERS/OPPONENTS 
[SAME AS PARTICIPANT] are intending to show up to this event to 
antagonize OPPONENTS/SUPPORTERS [OPPOSITE OF 
PARTICIPANT] and prevent them from spreading their faulty beliefs.  
o Would you like to learn more information about this event, including date, 
time, and location? (Yes/No) 
o Do you intend to attend this event? (Definitely not—Definitely yes) 
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